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 Turkey and Europeanization of
 Foreign Policy?
 TARIK OGUZLU
 Many commentators have recently argued that the confirmation of
 Turkey's European Union (EU) membership candidacy status in December 1999
 and the initiation of the formal accession negotiations in October 2005 have
 accelerated the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy (henceforth true
 Europeanization)} The most appropriate example mentioned in this regard is
 Turkey's refusal to cooperate with the United States on the eve of the war in
 Iraq in March 2003. The absence of EU support (particularly the German
 French axis) for the American war aims in Iraq was considered to have been
 one of the factors causing Turkey's reluctance to take part in the war. In a
 similar vein, Turkey's about-face in the Cyprus dispute has been attributed to
 the growing Turkish penchant for EU membership under the reign of the
 Justice and Development Party (henceforth AKP). The AKP leadership was
 assumed to have believed that the faster the Cyprus dispute was resolved, the
 greater would be the chances of Turkey's accession to the European Union.2
 Analysts also point to Turkey's changing approach toward the Kurds of
 northern Iraq in recent years to demonstrate true Europeanization. The claim
 here is that Turkey's "realist exclusionist" approach toward Iraqi Kurds has
 gradually turned out to be "liberal integrationist," alongside the EU accession
 1 Eleni Lazarou, "A European State in the Making? Europeanization and Turkish Foreign Policy"
 (Hellenic Center for European Studies policy paper [EKEM]), 2006, accessed at http://www.ekem.gr/
 archives/2006/1l/a_european_stat.html, 3 January 2009; Serhat Guvenc and Oya Memi?oglu, "Turkey
 and the Regional Security," in R. Griffits and D. Ozdemir, eds., "Turkey and the EU Enlargement:
 Process of Incorporation (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2004), 215-230. Mustafa Aydm
 and Sinem Acikme?e, "Europeanization through EU Conditionality: Understanding the New Era
 in Turkish Foreign Policy," Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9 (December 2007): 262-21A.
 2 "R.T. Erdogan, "Kibns'ta Ta?lar Oynadi" Voice of America, 25 April 2004, accessed at http://
 www.voanews.com/turkish/archive/2004-04/a-2004-04-25-4-l.cfm, 30 January 2009.
 TARIK OGUZLU is an associate professor of international relations at Bilkent University. He
 writes on Turkish foreign policy and the European Union. His articles have been published in
 leading journals.
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 process. Turkey was assumed to have believed that if Ankara treated Iraq and
 Iraqi Kurds as friends and through liberal eyes, Turkey would be seen as more
 European by the EU and the chances of its accession to the EU would increase.3
 Other observers note that Turkish foreign policy has recently become
 more multilateral and soft-power-oriented in the image of the European
 Union. The decision-making process in the foreign policy realm has also
 become more "civilianized," as Turkey undertook reforms in the structure
 of the National Security Council and as the salience of civil society organiza
 tions in public discussions on particular foreign policy issues has increased.4
 What such observations share in common is the assumption that these
 changes reflect the improving dynamics of Turkey's EU membership process
 and the growing determination on the part of Turkish foreign policy elites to
 join the European Union. Stated somewhat differently, true Europeanization
 owes its existence to the nationwide consensus that the adoption of the EU's
 foreign policy understanding and norms would be legitimate and appropriate
 on the way to Brussels.
 This article contends that Turkey's gradual adoption of EU foreign policy
 norms and practices is not the same thing as the Europeanization of Turkish
 foreign policy. Rather, this process should be defined as Turkey's Europeanizing
 foreign policy (henceforth apparent Europeanization). In this sense, this article
 makes a differentiation between apparent Europeanization and true Europeani
 zation. The former is Europeanization of foreign policy as effect/by-product,
 whereas the latter is Europeanization of foreign policy as cause. The Turkish case
 offers a clear example of the first. It is certain that Turkey's foreign policy has
 appeared European in recent years in terms of style, process, and outcomes', yet
 this should not be seen as true Europeanization, because this has not been
 caused by the dynamics of the EU accession process and Turkey's ideational
 commitment to EU membership. That said, this article equally probes into
 the reasons why Turkey's Europeanizing foreign policy has not been negatively
 affected by the change of government from mainstream political parties to the
 AKP in 2002 as well as the rise of Euro-skeptic feelings across the political spec
 trum. The main argument is that realpolitik security considerations to counter
 balance the United States and Iran, mitigating the negative consequences of
 the growing instability in the Middle East on national security interests, and
 the political motivations of the AKP, better account for the apparent Euro
 peanization in the post-September 11 era. Even if Turkey had not been pursuing
 the goal of membership in the EU, this process would have continued.
 3 David L. Phillips, "Turkey's Iraq Problem," The Boston Globe, 11 January 2007, accessed at
 http://ww.bostonxom/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/ll/01/turkeys_iraq_problem/,
 25 January 2009.
 4 ?ule Toktas. and Umit Kurt, The Impact of EU Reform Process on Civil-Military Relations in
 Turkey, SETA Policy Brief, No. 26, November 2008, accessed at http://www.setav.org/index.php?
 option=com_content&task=view&id=63l&Itemid=68, 10 January 2009.
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 This is not to say that the dynamics of the EU accession process has not
 played a role in this development. The demands on the part of the EU that
 Turkey harmonize the main tenets of its foreign policy understanding and
 practices with those of the EU, should it aspire to become a member, might
 have engendered some institutional reforms. However, the EU membership
 process has had limited impact on this development.
 Against such a background, the first part of the article will offer a con
 ceptual/theoretical discussion of the terms mentioned above. The goal is
 to help elucidate the differences between apparent Europeanization and true
 Europeanization. Then the article will offer an empirical analysis with a view
 to demonstrating the growing degree of apparent Europeanization in terms
 of style, process, and outcome dimensions. The following section will simply
 try to explain this outcome on the basis of non-EU-related factors, such as
 realpolitik-based security variables and the pragmatic approach of AKP-led
 Turkey to the EU. The main conclusion this article reaches is that the apparent
 Europeanization has lately become more an issue of strategic choice than an
 ideational requirement.
 Europeanization as Effect: Apparent Europeanization
 Here one is talking about the possibility that foreign policy norms and under
 standing of a particular country resemble the foreign policy understanding
 within the EU area. This might occur in terms of style, process, and outcome.
 Despite the fact that countries in different parts of the globe might adopt
 similar foreign policy practices and norms, there is a tendency in the literature
 to equate them with the EU.
 What motivates apparent Europeanization has nothing to do with idea
 tional commitments. The dynamics of the accession/integration process might
 lead foreign policymakers to adopt some norms and practices of the EU's
 foreign policy. However, for the dynamics of the accession process to produce
 such an outcome in the absence of strong ideational commitment to member
 ship, some other variables are needed. These might be other foreign policy
 concerns, pragmatic calculations, realpolitik security considerations, systemic
 factors, and dynamics of internal politics. Stated somewhat differently, countries
 would adopt EU foreign policy norms and practices so long as they believe that
 this would be in their interest. Here one talks about Europeanization in terms of
 a dependent variable, but not in terms of an independent variable. Here, it is the
 logic of consequentiality/instrumentality, rather than the logic of appropriateness,
 that shapes foreign policy choices of countries. This logic can apply equally to
 member and candidate countries.
 Insights of rationalist institutionalism are useful in this context. Rationalist
 institutionalism defines Europeanization as states' adaptation to EU foreign
 and security policy norms on the basis of strategic/instrumental concerns. Here,
 preferences are previously defined and remain unchanged. According to this
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 perspective, politics is seen as aggregating individual preferences into collective
 action by bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation, and exchange. Society is
 constituted of individuals for the fulfillment of individual ends.5 This approach
 simply holds that states try to achieve their foreign policy interests by utilizing
 all possible means at their disposal.6 Convergence with European Union norms
 results from the logic of consequentiality, prioritizing cost-benefit calculations
 on the part of candidate countries.7 Here, what exists is a pragmatic calculation
 with respect to the benefits of adopting a Europeanizing foreign policy. Aspi
 rant countries adopt an instrumental perspective in the sense that as long as
 appearing (acting) European serves their previously defined foreign policy
 interests, they go for it. Looking at it from this theoretical angle, Turkey's
 convergence with EU foreign policy norms and priorities should not be inter
 preted as evidence of its intention to help prove its European identity.
 Style
 This suggests that countries prefer to pursue their foreign policy interests in
 regional and multilateral settings and adopt civilian/economic instruments in
 achieving them.8 Threat or use of brute force in foreign policy is regarded as
 an inappropriate course of action, unless it is seen as a last resort. Even if coun
 tries had hard-power resources at their disposal, they would take utmost care to
 clothe their actions with international legitimacy. Adopting unilateral strategies
 of coercion, co-opting and coaxing with a view to imposing one's will on others
 is superseded by the idea that one's ability to shape others' decisions should
 emanate from the legitimacy of identity and interests in the eyes of others. Put
 simply, a state that adopts Europeanized foreign policy style would pay more
 attention to soft power than to hard power.9
 Moreover, such a state also tries to contribute to the emergence of EU-like
 regional security complexes in its own environment through civilian diplomacy,
 international law, multilateralism, and regional institutions.10 Diplomatic,
 5 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
 Orders," International Organization 52 (Autumn 1998): 943-969, at 949-950.
 6 Reuben Wong, "The Europeanization of Foreign Policy," in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith,
 eds., International Relations and the European Union (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press,
 2005), 134-153, at 137.
 7 Nicole Alecu de Flers, "Theorizing the Effects of CFSP on National Foreign Policy and the Con
 cept of Europeanization" (paper presented at FORNET Plenary Meetings, "Theoretical Perspectives
 on the CFSP: New Scholars' Roundtable"), accessed at http://www.fornet.info/fornetplenarymeetings.
 html, 11 January 2009.
 8 Robert Ladrech, "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,"
 Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (March 1994): 69-87, at 69.
 9 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
 10 Helene Sjursen and Karen E. Smith, "Justifying EU Foreign Policy: The Logics Underpinning
 EU Enlargement," ARENA Working Papers WP 01/1, 2001, accessed at http://www.arena.uio.no/
 publications/working-papers2001/papers/wp01_l.htm.
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 economic, and other peaceful ways of settling conflicts are considered more legiti
 mate than others while attempting to reach lasting solutions to border disputes.
 Process
 This means that the decision-making process in foreign and security policy
 realms becomes increasingly "civilianized."11 Elected civilians and non
 governmental civil society organizations become more influential in defining
 foreign policy interests than appointed bureaucrats.12 People who are in charge
 of policymaking make their decisions in transparent settings and are held ac
 countable to the public for the consequences of their behavior.
 This also suggests that the classic difference between high politics and
 low politics evaporates as issues become increasingly interlinked during the
 globalization process. The practice of defining potential security problems as
 political problems increases, and the idea that the adoption of extraordinary
 and emergency measures in dealing with security problems is legitimate be
 comes discredited. The goal becomes the politicization/de-securitization of
 all potential security problems so that their resolution through bargaining,
 consensus building, and negotiation becomes possible.13 Potential security
 problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved unless they are redefined as politi
 cal issues.14
 Outcome
 This suggests two things. One the one hand, specific foreign policy choices/
 positions of countries gradually converge with those of the European Union;
 on the other hand, some countries aspire to join the EU as members in order
 to achieve their interests more efficiently. Here, one is talking about the extent
 to which some countries adopt policies identical to those of the European
 Union in specific issue areas.
 These three dimensions of European-appearing foreign policy do not have
 to exist simultaneously. A particular country might adopt foreign policy posi
 tions on some issues resembling those of the European Union, yet might have
 11 Ozkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, "Civilianization in Greece versus Demilitarization in
 Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union,"
 Armed Forces & Society 32 (April 2006): 405-423, accessed at http://afs.sagepub.eom/cgi/reprint/32/3/
 405, 28 November 2008.
 12 RC. Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment," Hellenic Center for
 European Studies Policy paper (EKEM), 2002, accessed at http://www.ekem.gr/archives/2002/01/
 the_europeaniza.html, 26 November 2008.
 13 Karen E. Smith, "Still 'Civilian Power' EU?" (paper presented at the CIDEL Workshop, "From
 Civilian to Military Power: The European Union at a Crossroads?" Oslo, 22-23 October 2004).
 14 Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in D. Ronnie, ed., On Security (New York:
 Columbia University Press, 2005), 50.
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 an authoritarian and highly militarized foreign policy decision-making process
 as well as a unilateral and nationalistic foreign policy style.
 Europeanization as Cause: True Europeanization
 This concept refers to the fact that Europeanizing foreign policy is shaped by
 EU-related factors, which mainly concern the dynamics of the EU integration/
 enlargement process and the ideational commitment on the part of candidate
 countries to EU membership. In this sense, one can argue that Turkey's
 Europeanizing foreign policy could be redefined as the Europeanization of
 Turkish foreign policy if, and only if, the former were caused by the factors
 pertaining to the dynamics of Turkey's EU membership process.
 True Europeanization appears to be explained by the insights of socio
 logical institutionalism. People in charge of the foreign policymaking process
 would consider the norms of the European Union's foreign policy as appro
 priate and legitimate. Adopting them would be seen as fitting in their efforts
 to help prove their European identity. Sociological institutionalism frequently
 posits a world of individuals or organizations seeking to define and express
 their identity in socially appropriate ways.15 Europeanization as cause would
 appear mainly a top-down process in the sense that the hierarchical relation
 ship between the EU and candidate countries would not allow the latter to
 challenge the normative underpinnings of EU foreign policy.16 EU norms
 gradually become part of national identities and foreign policy practices
 throughout the accession process.17 Sociological institutionalism would define
 Europeanization as cause as a process, which may result in redefinition of
 states' foreign policy identities and preferences in line with the constitutive
 norms of the European Union.
 Long years of coexistence within EU institutional platforms would gradu
 ally help bring into existence a common foreign policy understanding inter
 subjectively shared by member states. Similarly, after a long accession process,
 candidate countries would begin to redefine their national identities as Euro
 pean and adopt Europeanized foreign policy. Faced with external stimuli, they
 would not consider whether they needed to adopt European foreign policy.
 15 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,"
 Political Studies 44 (December 1996): 936-957, at 949, accessed at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/
 dp96-6.pdf, 24 November 2008.
 16 Wong, "Europeanization of Foreign Policy," 142.
 17 Speech given by Anna Fotyga, the Polish Foreign Minister, at the Conference of the European
 Union Institute for Security Studies and European Center Natolin: Europe as a Global Power Warsaw
 Natolin, 19 May 2006, accessed at www.natolin.edu.pl/pdf/FN/FN_2_2006_fotyga.pdf, 12 December
 2008; Gordan Jandrokovic, Croatia's Foreign Minister, "Croatia says it will do 'whatever it takes' to
 join EU in 2010," statement given at a press conference with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn,
 7 April 2008, accessed at http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/croatia-takes-join-eu-2010/article
 171488,18 December 2008.
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 Whether the EU is a civilian, normative, soft, hard, or realpolitik actor, what
 matters is that candidate states would act out of the conviction that adopting
 EU foreign policy norms would accord with their Europeanizing identity.18
 For sociological institutionalism to make sense in the context of Turkish
 foreign policy, one needs to prove that the normative underpinnings of EU
 foreign policy need to be seen as legitimate at home. Faced with external chal
 lenges, the first question Turkey would ask should be how an EU candidate
 country should behave in this situation. Put another way, Turkey should act
 on the logic of appropriateness. Rather than questioning EU intentions on
 its membership status and indexing the degree of its own Europeanization
 to the EU's rewarding attitudes, the logic on the part of Ankara should be that
 the more a country proved its European identity, in this context through
 foreign policy, the more difficult would be justifying its exclusion from the
 EU on the basis of identity.19
 18 The literature on the EU is replete with alternative accounts of the EU as a foreign policy actor.
 Some claim that the EU is a typical soft power that takes its legitimacy from the attractiveness of its
 own model in the eyes of third parties. Soft-power EU simply leads by example; others argue that the
 EU is more a civilian actor than a military one, which employs non-military instruments in order to
 achieve its interests abroad; others posit that the EU is in fact a sui generis normative actor that tries
 to shape its milieu in its own image by dint of normative means, whatever they are. The EU is power
 ful simply because its internal practices define the standards of appropriate/normal behavior in the
 international arena. The EU is built on norms such as the rule of law, liberal democracy, respect for
 human rights, and free-market economy, and it tries to project them onto others with a view to trans
 forming them. Others point out that the EU is a typical imperial power that pursues sometimes nor
 mative, sometimes realpolitik interests and strategies, with a view to helping create a ring of friendly
 countries under its own influence. See Jean-Jves Haine, "The EU's Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?"
 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 5 (Winter/Spring 2004): 69-77, accessed at http://journal.
 georgetown.edu/issues/ws04/hainelocked.pdf, 4 December 2008; Joakim Kreutz, "Hard Measures by
 a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981-2004," Bonn International Center for
 Conversion, 2005, Paper 45, 1-50, accessed at http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/
 paper45/paper45.pdf, 5 December 2008; Francois Duchene, "Europe's Role in World Peace," in
 R. Mayne, ed., Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (London: Fontana, 1972), 32-47;
 Stelios Stavridis, "Why the 'Militarizing' of the European Union is Strengthening the Concept of a
 Civilian Power Europe" (EUI working paper RSC 17, 2001), 1-21, accessed at http://cadmus.eui.eu/
 bitstream/handle/1814/1726/01)17.pdf?sequence=l; Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe Con
 sidered: Beyond the Crossroads," Journal of European Public Policy 13 (March 2006): 182-199; Ian
 Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies
 40 (June 2002): 235-258; Helene Sjursen, "The EU as a 'Normative' Power: How Can This Be?" Jour
 nal of European Public Policy 13 (March 2006): 235-251; Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum,
 "Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism,"
 European Foreign Affairs Review 10 (2005): 535-552.
 19 This kind of Europeanization is totally different from the bottom-up Europeanization that can
 be defined as the externalization of national foreign policy interest onto the EU level from a tactical/
 instrumental perspective; see Wong, "Europeanization of Foreign Policy," 137. Here, the institutional
 platforms of the European Union would be deemed strategically vital in the materialization of key
 national foreign policy interests. The success of bottom-up Europeanization can be measured against
 the extent to which the EU's foreign policy principles and priorities would change in line with the
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 Describing Apparent Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy
 This section offers an empirical account of Turkey's apparent Europeanization
 in terms of style, process, and outcome dimensions. The goal is simply to dem
 onstrate the changes on the ground. The underlying causes of these changes
 will be dealt with in the following sections.
 In Terms of Style
 Recently, Turkey's efforts to pursue its foreign policies in regional and multi
 lateral platforms have accelerated. The goal of diplomacy has been redefined
 as achieving win-win outcomes for all parties involved, rather than imposing
 Turkey's will on the others.20 The old distinction that was assumed to exist
 between the domestic and external realms is no longer considered by Turkish
 foreign policymakers to be valid. It is now the case that Turkey's relations with
 third parties are seen as complementary to each other. Besides, Ankara has
 begun to see foreign policy as a distinctive policy realm, in which pursuing
 competitive relations with other actors no longer justifies unchangeable self
 other categorization.21 The "zero problems with neighbors" approach of the
 current AKP government appears to reflect this understanding.
 This approach seems to aim at paving the way for regional integration
 in Turkey's neighborhood whereby growing interdependent relations would
 decrease the possibility of resorting to and use of brute force in dealing with
 potential security problems. Ankara now acts on the assumption that growing
 regional economic, social, and political interdependence on the one hand and
 internal liberal-democratic transformation on the other are needed for the
 emergence of EU-like security communities in its neighborhood.
 In this context, Turkey's support for liberal democratic reforms in the
 Islamic world is worth mentioning. For example, in 2004, then-Turkish Foreign
 Minister Abdullah Gul recommended in the summit meeting of the Organization
 priorities of the initiator country. That said, this kind of Europeanization will apply only to member
 states, for other countries, particularly candidate countries, would be devoid of the capabilities of
 having access to the EU's institutional platforms. The best example in this context can be found in
 Greece's attempts at realizing its security interests vis-a-vis Turkey through the prerogatives of its EU
 membership.19 Greece has long tried to Europeanize its foreign policy interests vis-a-vis Turkey in an
 effort to extract as many concessions as possible from Turkey while the latter was trying to join the
 EU. The hope in Athens was that if Greece succeeded in masquerading its national policies vis-a-vis
 Turkey as European, its leverage vis-a-vis Turkey would increase. Greece would be successful if
 bilateral Turkish-Greek problems were redefined as Turkey-EU problems. See Panayotis Tsakonas,
 "Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy," Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 5 (Sep
 tember 2005): 427-443.
 20 Kemal Kiri?ci, "Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Foreign
 Policy," Middle East Review of International Affairs 8 (March 2004): 39-51, at 48.
 21 Sylvia Tiryaki, "Multidimensional Turkish Foreign Policy," Turkish Daily News, 2 June 2008,
 accessed at http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php7enewsid=106074, 3 December 2008.
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 of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that the Muslim world implement radical re
 forms in the realms of democracy and human rights.22 Similarly, Prime Minister
 Erdogan expressed the need for change and reformation in the Islamic world
 on various issues ranging from freedom of speech to women's rights. On one of
 those occasions, he prioritized democracy as the path through which the
 countries in the Islamic world should be governed.23
 One recent example in this regard pertains to Turkey's leading role in the
 Organization of the Islamic Conference. With its 57 member states spread over
 four continents, the OIC is the second largest inter-governmental organiza
 tion after the United Nations. Since 2005, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu of Turkey
 has been in charge of the OIC as Secretary General. Turkey has also gained
 observer status in the Arab League. Turkey's growing international profile
 attests to its inclination to pursue its interests through multilateral platforms.
 This approach is not solely confined to the Middle East. Turkey's efforts
 in finding solutions to emerging security challenges through regional and uni
 versal institutional settings becomes evident when one takes note of Turkey's
 pioneering role in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, the South
 east European Cooperative Initiative, etc.24 Specifically in the Balkans, Turkey
 contributes to various regional initiatives with objectives ranging from traditional
 peacekeeping to stabilization, to supporting Balkan countries' integration into the
 European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
 Turkey now tries to solve its security problems abroad by adopting diplo
 matic and economic instruments. Turkey has radically changed its approach
 toward Athens over the last decade. Greece is no longer seen as among the main
 threats to Turkey's security interests, and Ankara increasingly values the growing
 economic relations with Greece as key to peace in the region. Turkey supported
 the so-called Annan Plan in the process of the settlement of the Cyprus dispute
 and has recently made a new opening to the Republic of Armenia.25 The same
 22Yakup Beris and Ash Gurkan, "Broader Middle East Initiative: Perceptions from Turkey,"
 Turkey in Focus 2 (TUSIAD Publication, July 2004), accessed at http://www.tusiad.us/Content/
 uploaded/TURKEY-AND-BROADER-MIDDLE-EAST-TURKEY-IN-FOCUS-ISSUE7-FINAL.
 PDF, 7 December 2008.
 23 Recep Tayip Erdogan, "Din uzerinden siyaset suikasttir" ("Politics Through Religion is Suicide"),
 Hiirriyet, 7 July 2005, accessed at http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/07/07/668772.asp, 5 January 2009.
 24 Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which comprises 12 member countries in
 Southeast Europe and aims at curbing trans-border crime, is just one example of those regional
 initiatives; Turkey contributes not only to policing operations led by NATO or EU like SFOR,
 KFOR, 'Operation Concordia,' or EU's policing mission in Bosnia, but also takes part in several
 regional initiatives aimed at improving the Balkan region in different areas. For more information
 see Guner Oztek, "Situation in the Balkans and Turkey's Balkan Policy," 2004, accessed at www.
 obiv.org.tr/2004/Balkanlar/001-GUNER%20OZTEK.pdf, 13 January 2009.
 25 Bulent Aras and Fatih Ozbay, "Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work?"
 SETA Policy Brief 24 (September 2008), accessed at http://www.setav.org/index.php?option=com_
 content&task=view&id=571&Itemid=68, 13 March 2009.
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 approach is also observable in Turkey's recent adoption of the liberal-integrationist
 approach toward the Kurds of northern Iraq.
 Another policy that appears European is that Ankara pursued a vigorous
 diplomatic campaign across international platforms before making the decision
 to strike at the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) strongholds in northern Iraq in
 late 2007. In the past, Turkey organized dozens of cross-border operations but
 rarely cared to secure international legitimacy.26
 The other development worth of mentioning in this regard is Turkey's
 increasing efforts to play mediating roles in political/security problems in the
 Middle Eastern region. The recent examples include Ankara's efforts to help
 broker an agreement between Israeli and Syrian diplomats through indirect
 negotiations held in Istanbul, to help mediate between the Israeli government
 and the Palestinian Authority, particularly following the latest clashes be
 tween the Israeli army and Hamas in Gaza, to assist the dialogue between
 the European Union and Tehran, to bring the Afghan and Pakistani presidents
 to Ankara, and finally, to offer the Caucasia Stability and Cooperation Plat
 form in the wake of the latest clashes between the Russian and Georgian
 armies over the status of two Georgian enclaves, Abkhazia and Southern
 Ossetia.27 All such Turkish initiatives have been positively received by high
 level EU officials. The latest progress report on Turkey, which is issued by the
 European Commission on candidate countries, praises Turkey's effort to con
 tribute to regional peace and stability through these initiatives.
 In Terms of Process
 Recent years have also witnessed the growing role of civilians in the foreign
 policymaking process. For example, institutional reforms in the National Secu
 rity Council (NSC) caused a reshuffling of power in the process of foreign
 policymaking. The seventh reform package, which was passed on 23 July 2003,
 curtailed the military representation in the NSC. The decisions of the NSC are
 now advisory. The council now meets every two months, and its secretary general
 is a high-level civilian bureaucrat. Non-governmental civil society organizations,
 business associations, and economic interest groups have become influential
 actors in Turkish foreign policy as Turkey's integration into global economic
 structures has deepened. Think tanks have also come to the fore as key sites of
 foreign policy debates.
 Another development in this context is that foreign and security policy
 issues are now being discussed among the public to an extent one would have
 26 Gundiiz S. Aktan and Ali M. Koknar, "Turkey," in Y. Alexander, ed., Combating Terrorism:
 Strategies of Ten Countries (New Delhi: Manas, 2003), 278-281.
 27 Bulent Aras, "Turkey between Syria and Israel: Turkey's Rising Soft Power," SETA Policy Brief
 15 (2008), accessed at http://www.setav.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=472c&
 Itemid=68, 15 April 2009.
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 found unbelievable 10 years ago, particularly concerning relations with the
 EU, Cyprus, northern Iraq, Russia, and Armenia.28 The process of framing
 potential security issues as political issues is also becoming more evident
 (northern Iraq, Cyprus, and Armenia are the leading examples).29 It is of im
 portance that the recent changes in the Turkish approach toward the Cyprus
 dispute and Armenia have become possible through the active agency of
 business groups and civil society organizations. Increasing civilianization has
 contributed to the politicization of erstwhile hard-core security issues. The
 latest initiative on the need to apologize for the suffering of the Armenians
 during the so-called Armenian genocide in the course of World War I is a
 prime example of the growing influence of civilians on taboo issues. This
 apology campaign was organized by prominent intellectuals and supported
 by a quite number of Turkish people. Another example in this context is that
 lately the high military brass have decreased their public profile when foreign
 and security policy issues are discussed. They are now more reticent to make
 public comments on sensitive issues.
 In Terms of Outcome
 In terms of the degree of convergence between the foreign policy choices of
 Turkey and those of the European Union, one can argue that there has been a
 high degree of convergence in the Balkans and Caucasus (except Armenia),30 a
 growing degree of convergence in the Middle East (similar views on Iran, Iraq,
 Syria, and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute), a limited degree of convergence in
 the greater Black Sea region, including Russia, a high degree of convergence
 28 Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayan, "Introduction," in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayan, eds.,
 Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Washington
 Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 1-8. The situation is put forward as such: "Much of Turkish
 foreign-policy decision-making is shrouded in secrecy. Still, it can be safely said that the emergence
 of a stronger presidency and National Security Council over the last two decades of the twentieth
 century has increased the number of poles in Turkey's "multi-polar" decision-making apparatus.
 The primary reference points now seem to be the presidency, prime ministry, and military, with the
 foreign ministry nevertheless still an important player. Which takes the lead in a crisis seems to be a
 matter of personality, political circumstance, and the issue at hand." Little role used to be attributed to
 the public and think tanks. However, with the EU process, foreign and security policy became issues of
 public and open debate. Once, the multi-polarity in foreign policy decision making meant involvement
 of the presidency, prime minister, ministry of foreign affairs, and military in the process. However, now
 the process inevitably includes the public, media, think tanks, business associations, and so forth.
 29 Ay?e B. Qelik and Bahar Rumelili, "Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of the EU in
 Resolving Turkey's Kurdish Question and the Greek-Turkish Conflicts," European Foreign Affairs
 Review 11 (2006): 203-222.
 30 Katinka Barysch and Charles Grant, "Dealing with Risk: If Turkey and Europe Break Up,"
 Center for European Reform Bulletin Article (2006), accessed at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/barysch_
 grant_wef_turkey_nov06.pdf, 11 March 2009.
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.198 on Mon, 16 Oct 2017 11:22:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 668 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
 in Central Asia, and a limited degree of convergence in relations with the
 United States.31
 In the Balkans, Turkey supports EU policies of regional integration.
 To Ankara, the incorporation of the countries of the region into the Western
 international community through NATO and EU enlargement is the recipe for
 peace and stability.
 Turkey's policies in the Middle East also appear European. Turkey now
 clearly supports liberal-democratic reforms in the region, yet thinks that such
 processes should not be imposed on the current regimes from the outside.
 Likewise, regarding the European Union, Ankara holds that internal dynamics
 need to be strengthened. Turkey's support for democracy can be seen in
 Ankara's participation in the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
 as the democracy partner and the UN-led Alliance of Civilizations Initiative
 as one of the co-chairs. Ankara pays significant attention to improving its
 economic relations with neighbors and supports EU-led initiatives to con
 structively engage Syria and Iran. To Ankara and Brussels, the way to peace
 in the region passes through the incorporation of the regimes in Damascus and
 Tehran into the international community and the elimination of the structural
 causes of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Likewise, with regard to the European
 Union, Turkey has strongly criticized the use of overwhelming force by the
 Israeli army against the Palestinians in Gaza and voiced the view that Hamas
 needs to be incorporated into the peace talks as a legitimate party.
 Turkey's apparent EU-oriented foreign policy took an upward turn when
 Ankara dispatched its troops to Lebanon to take part in the EU-led peacekeep
 ing operation that was deployed to the region in the summer of 2006.
 Similar to the EU, Ankara values the continuation of Iraq's territorial
 integrity and the resolution of Iraq's ethnic and religious problems within
 the framework of internal liberal-democratic reforms. Turkey and the EU also
 see eye to eye concerning the transportation of Iranian and Turkmen gas to
 European markets through Anatolia. Both support the so-called Nabuco
 pipeline project in terms of the efforts to decrease dependency on Russian
 oil and gas. They have similar views on energy security. Turkey's convergence
 with EU priorities also became noticeable when Ankara tried to justify its
 non-cooperation with the United States on the eve of the Iraq war by referring
 to the strong French-German opposition to U.S. policies. Similar to the EU,
 Turkey supports a global system that operates on the basis of international
 law, international organizations, and international legitimacy. Both oppose
 the transformation of NATO into a global collective security organization that
 would serve as a tool kit for the United States.
 Turkey's convergence with the European Union concerning Russia is
 somewhat limited. Despite the fact that Ankara shares the EU's view that
 31 Kemal Kiri?ci, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times (Paris: Institute for Security Studies,
 Chaillot Paper 92, 2006), accessed at http://aei.pitt.edu/7409/01/chai92.pdf, 15 February 2009.
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 Russia should transform into a liberal-democratic country and become a
 responsible member of the international community, Ankara also supports
 the Russian claim that EU and NATO eastward enlargement should not be
 realized at the expense of Moscow's security concerns. From Ankara's point
 of view, the West should treat Russia with respect and the current tension
 in Russia-West relations should not put Turkey's improving relations with
 Russia into jeopardy.32
 Explaining Apparent Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy
 Europeanization as Cause: How Relevant Is It?
 The goal here is to determine whether the recent changes in Turkish foreign
 policy, as described in the previous section, have been caused by the dynamics
 of Turkey's EU accession process and Turkey's perception of EU foreign policy
 norms as legitimate. What are the limits of Europeanization as cause?
 It would not be an over-estimation to argue that the radical reforms under
 taken in relation to the National Security Council have been done at the urge
 of the European Union. The emerging consensus that security cannot be
 achieved at the expense of democratization and human rights might also
 owe its existence to the ongoing EU accession process. Improving relations with
 Greece, Cyprus, Syria, and Armenia, as well as the adoption of soft-power
 instruments abroad, might also have been impacted by the EU's demand that
 Turkey's prospective membership would only be possible if Ankara developed
 good relations with its neighbors.33 After all, one specific chapter of the entire
 negotiation package concerns harmonization of Turkish foreign policy with
 EU foreign and security policy. That said, the style and process dimensions
 of Turkey's Europeanizing foreign policy might have been informed by the
 dynamics of the EU accession process.
 However, this analysis should not lead to a conclusion that all such changes
 suggest the strengthening of ideational commitment on the part of Turkish
 elites toward EU membership, for recent years have witnessed growing degrees
 of Euro-skepticism in Turkey. This has been the case despite the start of the
 formal negotiations in October 2005, and can best be observed in the declining
 support that Turkey's traditionally Western-oriented elites are giving the EU
 project. These circles have increasingly begun to question the rationale of Turkey's
 32 Hasan Ali Karasar, "Saakashvili Pulled the Trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia" SETA
 policy brief (August 2008), accessed at http://www.setav.org/index.php7option=com_content&task=
 view&id=545&Itemid=68, 11 May 2009.
 33 EU Helsinki Summit Resolutions, accessed at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.
 htm, 9 November 2008; Negotiation Framework Document, accessed at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/
 files/ AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/NegotiatingFrameowrk/Negotiating_Frameowrk_Full.pdf,
 14 November 2008.
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 EU vocation on the grounds of structural incompatibilities between the foun
 dational logics of the Turkish Republic on the one hand and the EU integration
 process on the other. These circles fret that the Europeanization process might
 in the end result in the weakening of Turkey's unitary, homogenous, and secular
 state identity; that Turkey might one day come out of this process as a federated/
 decentralized state with Turkish society transforming into a multi-cultural entity
 alongside ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences. That is why these circles
 have viewed the AKP-led Europeanization reforms in recent years through
 skeptical eyes. The possibility that Islam's public role might increase alongside
 the ongoing liberal-democratic reforms has added additional insult to the injury.
 Given this, these circles have not hesitated to resort to some non-democratic
 means in the recent past, with a view to preventing the allegedly Islamist AKP
 from electing its candidate to the presidency in early 2007.
 Interesting to note in this context is that the so-called ulusalcilik movement
 has recently come to the fore as an alternative foreign policy ideology, reflect
 ing many of the reservations of Turkey's traditional security elites.34 To the
 adherents of this view, it would be better if Turkey were to pursue an Eurasianist
 foreign policy, rather than aspiring to come closer to the West. To them, the West
 does not treat Turkey as a legitimate member of the Western international
 community. Rather than this being the case, they see Turkey as a buffer zone
 separating the EU's Kantian security environment from the Hobbesian security
 environment in the greater Middle East. The Western approach toward Turkey
 is instrumental in the sense that the West indirectly supports Turkey's trans
 formation into a moderate Islamic country so that the West could better deal with
 radical Islam. This Western conceptualization of Turkey prioritizes Turkey's
 Islamic and Middle Eastern identities. This fits in perfectly with the AKP's
 conceptualization of Turkish foreign policy interests, particularly in the context
 of the Middle East. That said, these circles believe that Turkey's transforma
 tion alongside the EU accession process will paradoxically strengthen Turkey's
 Islamization and Middle Easternization, contradicting the gist of Turkey's tra
 ditional Westernization process.
 $uch influential members of traditional security elites as retired general
 Tuncer Kilic have even argued that Turkey's links to the Western international
 community should be severed and that Turkey should follow a Eurasianist
 foreign policy course. This suggests that relations with Russia, China, and Iran
 should be improved, so much so that Turkey would form strategic partnerships
 with these countries. To these elites, Turkey's membership in NATO and the
 dynamics of the EU accession process limit Turkey's maneuvering capability
 abroad. The demands of the EU membership process are reminiscent of the
 still-born Treaty of Sevres that the victorious powers of World War I tried to
 impose on the Ottoman Empire in 1920.
 34 Emrullah Uslu, "Ulusalcilik: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey," Turkish Studies
 9 (March 2008): 73-97.
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 What seems to be a paradox is this regard is the fact that these circles
 have traditionally supported Turkey's European vocation and equated it to
 Turkey's modernization/civilization process, yet they have recently turned into
 the most ardent opponents of the EU process. One factor that might explain
 this is that these circles would certainly lose some of their prerogatives in the
 making of Turkey's foreign and security policy decisions alongside the changes
 in the style and process dimensions of Turkish foreign policy.
 Another factor that appears to have diluted Turkey's identity-based commit
 ment toward EU membership can be attributed to the instrumental/consequential
 logic on the part of the AKP government toward the EU. It has gradually become
 clear that this Party does not attach a strong ideational commitment to Turkey's
 prospective EU membership in the sense that such an outcome would eventually
 help confirm Turkey's European identity irreversibly.
 Analysts still discuss to what extent the ruling AKP sincerely supports
 Turkey's European vocation. Suspicions particularly linger on the intentions
 of the Party to view the Europeanization process from an instrumental per
 spective in an effort to help further Islamize Turkish society. For example,
 the key figures of the Party have not minced words in criticizing European
 institutions, most notably the European Court of Human Rights, when the
 latter made it clear that the wearing of headscarves (turbans, in Turkey) could
 be prohibited in public places if it was perceived as a threat to Turkey's secular
 identity. The AKP has slowed the pace of the EU reform process over the last
 three years, lest the Party lose ground to the circles that might possibly thrive
 on the growing feeling of Euro-skeptic nationalism. Against such develop
 ments, it would not be wrong to state that a nationwide consensus is still missing
 on the appropriateness of Turkey's efforts to join the EU from an identity
 related perspective.
 Another factor that has equally contributed to the erosion of Turkey's
 ideational commitment to the EU is the growing European opposition to
 Turkey's possible inclusion in the EU on the basis of inherent identity differ
 ences.35 Paradoxically, opposition to Turkey's possible EU membership has
 increased despite the fact that Turkey has institutionally come closer to the
 EU than ever following the initiation of the formal accession negotiations in
 October 2005. Despite the fact that the coming to power of the AKP initially
 helped boost Turkey's soft power in the eyes of European circles on the
 grounds that Turkey could be the prime example of Islam and liberal democ
 racy coexisting peacefully, sympathy toward Turkey has gradually waned as
 many Europeans have begun to define Islam as one of the potential others
 of the secular multicultural EU. Turkey's ideational commitment to the EU
 35 Lauren M. McLaren, "Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership in the EU," European
 Union Politics 8 (June 2007): 251-278; Claes H. de Vresse, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Holli A.
 Semetko, "Hard and Soft Public Support for Turkish Membership in the EU," European Union
 Politics 9 (December 2008): 511-530.
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 weakened further when the European Union did not kept its promise of easing
 the trade embargo on the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus following the
 approval of the so-called Annan Plan by Turkish Cypriots; when such figures
 as Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy argued that Turkey should be offered
 the privilege of partial membership rather than full membership; when the
 French and Austrian governments made it clear that they would bring the
 issue of Turkey's membership to the public referenda; when the Negotiation
 Framework Document stated that the negotiation process with Turkey would
 be open-handed and the EU would take into consideration its absorption
 capacity in deciding on whether to admit Turkey; and when some EU mem
 bers, such as France, asked Turkey to recognize what happened during the
 course of the World War I in relation to the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman
 Empire as genocide.
 Based on this analysis, one expects to see that Turkey's foreign policy
 would not evolve in line with EU norms and practices and that opposition
 to Turkey's EU membership would decrease. However, rather than this being
 the case, Turkish foreign policy has in recent years gained a European outlook.
 For example, the ex-Chief of Staff, Hiiseyin Kivnkoglu, openly stated that
 membership in the EU has become a geopolitical necessity on the part of
 Turkey.36 The sections that follow try to demonstrate this.
 Realpolitik Concerns to Soft-balance the United States
 It is the U.S. policies in Iraq and the Middle East that have recently impacted
 Turkey's foreign and security policy interests the most profoundly. The U.S.
 led war in Iraq and the American policies toward democracy promotion during
 the post-September 11 era have caused consternation in Ankara primarily
 because such policies appear to have shaken up the status quo with which
 Turkey has not been at odds. Ankara felt quite discontented with the growing
 instability in Iraq following the ouster of Saddam Hussein's regime. As the
 possibility of Iraq's disintegration along ethnic and religious lines and of
 the formation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq increased,
 the United States appeared as a potential security threat to Ankara rather than
 a security provider.37
 The same logic also holds true as far as Turkey's disillusionment with U.S.
 policies toward Syria and Iran are concerned. Whereas Washington tended to
 define these countries as parts of the infamous "axis of evil" and as needing to
 36Fikret Bila, "Kivnkoglu: Yuzumuz Batiya Donuktur" ("Our Face Is Towards Europe"), Milliyet,
 23 January 2009, accessed at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx7aType=YazarDetayArsiv&
 ArticleID=1050987&AuthorID=61&b=Kivrikoglu:%20Yuzumuz%20Batiya%20donuktur&a=
 Fikret%20Bila, 16 February 2009.
 37 Ay?egul Sever, "Turkey and U.S. on Iraq since the Gulf War," Turkish Review of Middle Eastern
 Studies 13 (Annual 2002/2003): 24-39, at 33.
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 be contained through every possible means available, Ankara not only thought
 that peace and stability in the region could in no way be achieved without the
 inclusion of Damascus and Tehran in the larger Middle East peace process, but
 also has expended great effort to improve its own relations with them over the
 last decade.38 Given that Turkey and Syria were on a collision course over the
 PKK (an ethnic Kurdish terrorist organization operating in southeast Turkey)
 nearly a decade ago, observers are now surprised by the growing economic,
 political, and security ties between the two countries. There is now a free-trade
 agreement in existence, and Syrian leaders value Turkey's role as facilitator in
 the Middle East peace process. The point that needs to be underlined here is
 that the start of the accession talks with the European Union has positively
 contributed to Turkey's regional standing, as well as making it possible for
 Turkey's calls for liberal democratic transformation to be received positively.
 Turkey's coming closer to the European Union in the post-Iraq war era is
 the result, in part, of the changing dynamics of Turkish-American relations
 over the last years. This process in fact started following the dissolution of
 the Soviet Union but reached its climax in the aftermath of the U.S.-led occu
 pation of Iraq. Simply stated, Turkey hopes that it could better balance the
 United States through its institutional links to the European Union. Joining
 the EU as a member, Europeanization as outcome, would help crown Turkey's
 ability to counterbalance the United States. This has been necessitated by the
 declining significance of NATO as a Europe-oriented collective defense orga
 nization in which Ankara could interact with Washington multilaterally. Mem
 bership in NATO no longer suggests that Turkey and the United States share
 similar threat perceptions. Turkey's membership in NATO no longer implies
 that Turkey is a European country and that strong American backing im
 proves the prospects of its membership in the EU. To Ankara, NATO is no
 longer a Europe-oriented collective defense alliance in which the credentials
 of Turkey's European identity are fully recognized. The more NATO turned
 out to be a collective security organization with a global reach, the less likely
 was Turkey to legitimize its own European identity on the basis of its NATO
 membership. The fear on the part of Ankara has long been that the more
 bilateral the relations turned out to be, the more leverage the United States
 38 "Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah GUI on Saturday December 26, 2005 dismissed reports that
 the US had offered a deal to attack the PKK Kurdish organization in return for allowing an attack on
 Iran.... Turkey has long strategic relations with USA, however, the relations between Turkey and
 neighboring Iran have also improved in remarkable ways in recent years following reciprocal trust
 boosting measures," reported by Arabic News, accessed at http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/
 Day/051226/2005122618.html, 17 February 2009. In addition, on various occasions, former Foreign
 Minister GUI and Prime Minister Erdogan repeated that Turkey is in favor of a diplomatic solution
 with Iran and Syria. See "The Turkish Passage Dar al Hayat," accessed at http://english.daralhayat.
 com/opinion/OPED/04-2008/Article-20080428-95667781-c0a8-10ed-01e2-5c7325258e03/story.html
 17 December 2008; Taha Akyol, "GUI's Iran Misyonu" ("Gul's Iran Mission"), Milliyet, 26 June 2006,
 accessed at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/06/26/yazar/akyol.html, 18 December 2008.
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 would have on Turkey. From this perspective, Turkey's bargaining power vis-a-vis
 the United States would certainly increase following its membership in the EU.39
 Recent years have made it clear that the United States cannot offer Turkey
 a long-lasting strategic relationship reminiscent of the Cold War era. Its com
 mitment to Turkey's territorial security is no longer guaranteed. U.S. and
 Turkish security priorities have begun to diverge over the last decade. The
 United States and Turkey do not see eye to eye on the way in which security
 threats and terrorism are defined and on how to cope with them.40 Post
 September 11-era developments have contributed to this drifting apart. The
 perception that siding with the United States would benefit Turkey's security
 interests has gradually become discredited as both capitals have adopted dia
 metrically opposing views on as many issues areas as possible, such as Iraq,
 PKK terrorism, Syria, Hamas, and Iran. For example, despite all its reserva
 tions, Turkey finds the European approach to the Kurdish question in the
 Middle East more acceptable than the American approach. While the EU
 appears to believe that the misery of the Kurdish people in the region should
 be ended through internal liberal democratic reforms within the internationally
 recognized borders, Washington appears to be predisposed toward the idea
 that an independent Kurdish state is what might be needed in this regard.41
 Even though the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s made it clear that
 the dynamics of Turkey's relationship with the United States would no longer
 reflect the close strategic relationship of the past, Turkish decision makers
 have long failed to grasp the changing realities on the ground. Gone were
 the good old days during which the U.S. commitment to Turkey's security
 within the framework of NATO was undisputed. Rather than grasping this,
 Ankara has tended to believe that the rise of the Middle East in the strategic
 priorities of the United States would elevate Turkey's status in Washington
 to a higher place than was the case during the Cold War era. Ankara also
 assumed that U.S. support for Turkey's membership in the EU would help
 accelerate the process of Turkey's inclusion in the EU.42
 39 Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. in a Changing Strategic Environment," testimony
 before the House International Relations Committee, Europe Subcommittee CT-179,107th Cong., 1st sess.,
 (13 June 2001), accessed at http.V/www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT179.pdf, 12 April 2009; Lesser,
 a senior analyst at RAND specializing in Mediterranean and strategic affairs, explained in his testimony
 before The House International Relations Committee that we may not wish to see Turkish attitudes
 toward Iraq or Iran further "Europeanized."
 40 Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush, "Is the United States Losing Turkey?" Hudson Institute
 White Papers (2007), 1-41, accessed at http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf,
 13 December 2008.
 41 Nihat Ali Ozcan and M. Hakan Yavuz, "Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Develop
 ment Party," Middle East Policy 13 (Spring 2006): 102-119.
 42 Statement given by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan, at a press conference in Washington,
 The United States Mission to the European Union, accessed at http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?
 ID-31F390DB-BA6A-4FA0-BE0F-A97E3B6C2D5D, 11 February 2009.
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 However, the so-called strategic partnership between the two capitals in
 the late 1990s only became possible due to conjectural convergence of Turkish
 and American interests, rather than the shared belief that Turkey and the
 United States were allies in NATO and that what was good for one would also
 be good for the other. Instead, the developments on the ground helped prove
 that the United States valued Turkey's cooperation and supported its EU
 vocation so long as Turkey helped Washington win the war on global terror,
 stabilize Iraq, contain Iran and Syria, and secure U.S. access to the oil and gas
 resources of the Middle Eastern and Eurasia.43 Worse, strong American sup
 port for Turkey's EU membership has lately begun to backfire by leading to
 vocal European criticism of U.S. involvement in the EU's own relations with
 Turkey. Such American support might also have led Turkish decision makers
 in the past to believe that the EU would have no choice but to let Turkey in
 the club for strategic reasons. In fact, too much emphasis on Turkey's strategic
 value has both delayed Turkey's democratization process at home and con
 tradicted the gist of the EU enlargement policy.
 On the basis of post-Cold War-era U.S. strategic behavior, as well as of the
 way in which Washington treated Ankara on the eve of the latest war in Iraq,
 the AKP leadership appears to have concluded that the United States has
 transformed into a truly global actor and no longer values long-term alliance
 relationships with third countries. Save for the United Kingdom and Israel, the
 United States has no long-term strategic alliances but instead functional coop
 erative relationships with key countries in particular regions. Turkey is one of
 those key countries in a strategic region for U.S. interests, the Middle East.
 Against such a background, to the AKP leadership and traditional security
 elites alike, Ankara should never entrust its security to the U.S.-led NATO,
 but should rather aspire to become part of the European Union. This has grad
 ually become more compelling as the European Union has been developing
 its own military security capabilities independent of NATO and as Turkey's
 economic development has increasingly depended on integration with European
 markets. It is now a widely shared belief in Ankara that Turkey would be better
 served in dealing with the challenges of globalization as an EU member. As
 regional groupings have become the key actors in global politics, the need for
 Turkey to join the EU has increased.
 Even though Turkey still attaches a great deal of importance to NATO, it
 has grown discontent with the idea that NATO could be considered at best a
 tool kit for the United States. Ankara increasingly questions the credibility of
 the U.S. commitment to NATO as well as the capability of the Alliance to
 counter post-Cold War threats, particularly in the context of Afghanistan.44
 43 Menon and Wimbush, "Is The United States Losing Turkey," 3-5.
 44 Tank Oguzlu, "Turkey and the Transformation of NATO," SETA Policy Brief 33 (July 2009),
 accessed at http://www.setav.org/index.php7option=com_content&task=view&id=892&Itemid=57,
 18 February 2009.
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 This might partially explain why Turkey has been pressing increasingly for
 inclusion and more-active involvement in European defense planning.
 The Impact of the AKP
 Many observers unite around the view that Turkey's march toward Europe
 accelerated the most during the reign of the AKP government. This article
 does not deny this, but argues that this has not been caused by the AKP's com
 mitment to the EU from an ideational perspective.
 The view that the fight against religiously inspired terror would be better
 waged in the post-September 11 era if moderate and liberal Islamic circles
 came to power in predominantly Islamic societies led to a positive reception
 in the West of the electoral victory of the AKP in 2002. If Turkey succeeded in
 demonstrating that Islam and democracy could coexist together, this might
 help the Western international community win the ideational battle against
 the radical Islamists. This systemic factor can partially explain the growing
 American support for Turkey's EU membership as well as Turkey's further
 Europeanization at home and abroad.45 No doubt the AKP leadership has
 capitalized well on these emerging global dynamics. On one hand, Turkey
 participated as a democratic partner in the U.S.-led Broader Middle East
 and North African Initiative, and on the other, as one of the co-chairs in the
 UN-led Alliance-of-Civilization Initiative.46
 A particular motivation that might possibly explain the AKP's willing
 ness to adopt a pro-EU orientation at home and abroad might be that the
 Party lacked internal legitimacy. Pursuing Europeanizing domestic and
 foreign policy orientations might have been considered instrumental in help
 ing dispel the fears of Turkey's traditional elites that the AKP has not
 embraced Turkey's decades-long Westernization process and secular state
 identity. After all, who would dare think that the AKP's real goal was to
 transform Turkey into an Islamic society when the pace of Europeanization
 process accelerated?47
 Even though the AKP does not define itself as "Muslim democrat" or
 "political Islamist," many of its critics argue that it represents the continuation
 of political Islam under a new guise. Therefore, the Party felt the need to de
 fine itself either as a post-Islamist party or a conservative democratic party.
 45 Sedat Laciner, "Turkey's EU Membership's Possible Impacts on the Middle East," Turkish Weekly,
 23 March 2007, accessed at http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php7id=43696,16 January 2009.
 46 Gokhan ?etinsaya, "The New Middle East, Turkey and the Search for Regional Stability,"
 (working paper, 2008), accessed at http://www.acus.org/programs-relations.asp, 24 February 2009.
 47 Ali Balci, "Medeniyetler Ittifaki ve AKP" ("Alliance of Civilizations and JDP")," Radikal,
 12 November 2006, accessed at http://www.radikal.com.tr/ek_haber.php?ek=r2&haberno=6425,
 27 November 2008; Mohammed Ayoob, "Who's Afraid of a Head Scarf?" YaleGlobal, 10 May
 2007, accessed at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=9165, 28 November 2008.
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 Adopting a Europeanizing foreign policy might have been thought of as
 bolstering the AKP's institutional identity as such.48
 The AKP's motivation to accelerate Europeanization as process can also
 be attributed to the determination of the Party leadership to curtail the politi
 cal influence of appointed bureaucrats in politics, particularly in the military
 and judiciary. EU-led democratization would in the end strengthen the civili
 zation process at home.49 Foreign policy would become a platform on which
 the AKP leadership could possibly help erode the undisputed role of the army
 at home. To the Party, the task of defining Turkey's national interests by elected
 civilians would be much easier if the role of the army in shaping Turkey's poli
 cies on key security and foreign policy issues were challenged.50 The Cyprus
 dispute offers the best example in this context. Turkey's approval of the Annan
 Plan should not be interpreted as an example of the ETFP (Europeanization
 of Turkish Foreign Policy). Instead, it constitutes an example of apparent
 Europeanization that has been mainly informed by AKP's intentions to chal
 lenge the primacy and legitimacy of traditional security elites through foreign
 policy.51 Turkey's ideational commitment to EU membership seems to have
 played a negligible role in this context, if any role at all.
 Cooperation with Greece and improvement of relations with other neigh
 bors in the image of EU foreign policy understanding were considered useful
 strategies through which AKP could shake up the influential position of tra
 ditional security elites. After all, the more cooperative and stable relations
 Ankara developed with neighbors, the less able traditional security elites
 would be to justify their undisputed roles in the policymaking process. Turkey's
 changing policy toward Greece also reflects an instrumental/pragmatic con
 cern on the part of the AKP government, in that through rapprochement,
 Ankara wanted to deny Athens any pretext on which it could veto Turkey's
 EU accession process.
 The AKP's conceptualization of Turkey's foreign policy identity also offers
 another justification for apparent Europeanization, particularly in terms of
 Europeanization as style and outcome. The goal of the Party is to help trans
 form Turkey into a "central country," having multiple identities and exerting a
 leadership role in the surrounding regions.52 This would only become possible
 48 Mohammed Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality," World Policy Journal 21 (Fall 2004):
 1-14.
 49 Ayoob, "Who's Afraid of a Head Scarf?"
 50 The party program of the Justice and Development Party, Security, chap 4.5, 14 August 2001,
 accessed at http://eng.akpatri.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#4.5, 15 December 2008.
 51 Alper Kaliber, "Securing the Ground through Securitized 'Foreign' Policy: The Cyprus Case,"
 Security Dialogue 36 (September 2005): 319-337.
 52 "An Eminence Grise: The Visionary behind Turkey's Newly Assertive Foreign Policy," The
 Economist, 15 November 2007, accessed at http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.
 cfm?story_id=10146653, 23 December 2008.
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 if Turkey adopted a multilateral/regional and soft-power-oriented foreign
 policy style similar to that of the EU.
 To the Party, Turkey is simultaneously a part of various regional security
 complexes at the same time. Turkey is a European and Middle Eastern coun
 try simultaneously. Turkey represents the European world in the Middle East
 and the Islamic world in Europe.53 This approach does not prioritize Turkey's
 European identity over others. Rather, Turkey under the reign of the AKP has
 tried to reach the West through the Middle East, and vice versa. The calculation
 has been that just as the apparent Europeanization would help enhance Turkey's
 position in the Middle East, Turkey's potential contribution to European secu
 rity interests in the Middle East would help increase the prospects of Turkey's
 accession to the EU. One of the best examples that can be offered in this con
 text to help substantiate this claim is Turkey's decision not to participate in the
 U.S.-led war against Saddam's Iraq in March 2003. This Turkish decision defi
 nitely boosted Turkey's standing in the eyes of both Europeans and Muslims in
 the Middle East.54
 Rather than adopting an ideational commitment to the EU, the AKP has
 instrumentally supported the EU membership process so long as this process
 helped Turkey to transform into a liberal-pluralist polity in the age of globali
 zation, to solve its perennial domestic problems, such as ethnic Kurdish sepa
 ratism, to reach out to non-European geographies easily, to play a leadership
 role in its environment, and to be viewed positively by its neighbors.55
 Regarding the positions the AKP government has adopted on such foreign
 policy issues as relations with Russia, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, one can argue that
 Turkey would have possibly adopted the same positions if it had not been
 negotiating membership with the European Union. The foreign policy doc
 trine of the new government, as formulated by the chief foreign policy adviser
 to the Prime Minister, would have dictated soft-power-oriented multilateral
 interactions with neighbors at any rate. Otherwise, Turkey's leadership poten
 tial in its environment in line with the neo-Ottomanist understanding would
 not have come true.
 According to this understanding, Turkey should try to shape its environ
 ment by capitalizing mainly on its "strategic depth," which appears to emanate
 from Turkey's multi-dimensional identity, Ottoman past, and geopolitical loca
 tion at the crossroads of three continents.56 Turkey's capability to make use of
 its strategic depth in this regard will certainly hinge on its success in making
 53 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik Tiirkiye'nin Uluslararasi Konumu (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlan,
 2004).
 54 Meliha Altuni?ik, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East," Arab Studies
 Quarterly 27 (January 2005): 1-18.
 55 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "Her kosulda bans" ("Peace No Matter What"), Radikal, 1 June 2004,
 accessed at http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php7haberno=117992, 11 April 2009.
 56 Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, 65-93.
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 peace with its own multicultural identity and consolidating plural democracy
 at home.
 Neo-Ottomanists argue that the more crosscutting and overlapping net
 works Turkey could create in its region, the more powerful it would be.57
 Approaching security from the realpolitik perspective prioritizing self-other
 distinctions does not fit in with this neo-Ottomanist understanding, for fears
 of encirclement, dismemberment, and abandonment could only be eliminated
 through Turkey's engagement in various security complexes simultaneously.
 This has become more observable in the post-September 11 era. The traditional
 idea that Turkey's placement in the West would become possible if its links to
 the Middle East were severed has now been replaced by the understanding that
 Turkey can now reach to the West through its links to the East and vice versa.58
 From this perspective, there is nothing wrong with Turkey playing a peace
 brokering role in regional disputes and increasing its regional standing. This
 is an active, agenda-setting, assertive role and in this regard differs from the
 traditional Kemalist understanding. This ambitious role conception does not,
 however, suggest that Ankara should try to impose its previously defined
 national interests on others. Instead, the goal appears to be helping to shape
 developments in different regions, lest they negatively impact Turkey's interests
 at home. In this regard, neo-Ottomanism is defensive. Crises around Turkey
 should be managed or resolved so that Turkey's liberal democratization pro
 cess can continue unabated at home.
 Under the reign of the AKP government, Turkey has of late become a trading
 state rather than a military state. Otherwise, a defensive, reactive, military-oriented
 and introvert foreign and security understanding that puts the preservation of
 Turkey's traditional secular, homogenous, nation-state identity at the top would
 help legitimize the custodian and guardianship role of the Turkish army.
 Realpolitik Concerns to Transform the Middle East and Iraq into a
 Stable Area
 In the image of the AKP leadership, the Europeanized foreign policy would help
 improve Turkey's capabilities to deal with the security challenges emanating
 from the greater Middle Eastern region. A Turkey that acts as a "European"
 country would be more able to mitigate the negative consequences of the re
 gional insecurity in the Middle East on its national interests at home. This view
 is now also shared by traditional security elites.59
 57 Ibid., 115-119.
 58 Omer Ta?pinar, "Turkey's Middle East Policies between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism,"
 Carnegie Papers 10 (September 2008), accessed at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cmeclO_
 taspinar_final.pdf.
 59 On various occasions, several top-ranking commanders of Turkish armed forces made remarks
 in this regard; see (Ret.) Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok's New Year's message, 31 December
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 As it appears today, the Middle Eastern region looks like a classic textbook
 example of a Hobbesian security complex, in which the possibility of interstate
 and intra-state warfare is extremely high.60 Worse, the possibility of Turkey
 being drawn into such a security complex is quite high, given Turkey's prox
 imity to the region as well as its vulnerability to what happens there.61
 In contrast to the Middle East, the EU represents a Kantian security com
 plex, in which the possibility of using brute force in settling disputes is at an all
 time low due to the decades-long integration process in economic, political,
 and security realms. What Ankara wants is to escape the danger of being a
 part of the Hobbesian security complex to the south and to become a part
 of the Kantian security complex to the west. This is simply in Turkey's security
 interests. For this to happen, two things need to materialize at the same time.
 On the one hand, Turkey needs to undertake the so-called Copenhagen cri
 teria at home; on the other hand, this internal reformation process need not
 be negatively impacted by external developments in the Middle East.62 This
 explains why the liberal democratic transformation of the region is now con
 sidered a must for the continuation of the same process at home. Turkey's con
 tinuing Europeanization at home increasingly requires the transformation of
 the conflict-producing Middle Eastern region into an EU-like security com
 munity in which growing interdependent relations decrease the possibility of
 the use of force in the settlement of disputes and security is redefined in a post
 territorial and post-sovereign manner. Acting as a European country in a typi
 cally non-European geography, with a view to playing a transformative role
 there, is in Turkey's national security interest. It has nothing to do with pleasing
 the EU.
 Turkey's potential to play a facilitator role in this regard would probably
 increase if Turkey's image in the Middle East improved. For Turkey's messages
 2004; accessed at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_l_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_l_8_Mesajlar/
 2004/yeniyilmesaji_311204.html, 26 December 2008; General Ergin Saygun, (paper presented at
 symposium on "NATO in Changing Security Environment" ["Degi?en Guvenlik ortaminda NATO"],
 31 May 2007), accessed at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_l_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_l_7_
 Konusmalar/2007/sempozyum_II_bsk_acilis31052007.htm, 24 December 2008. General Ilker Basbug,
 opening speech at the symposium on "Evaluation of Regions in Crisis and Their Influence on
 Turkish Security, from Turkish, NATO and EU Perspectives" (Tiirkiye, NATO ve AB perspektifinden
 Kriz Bolgelerinin incelenmesi ve Tiirkiye'nin giivenligine etkileri sempozyumu), 27 May 2007, ac
 cessed at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_l_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_l_7_Konusmalar/2004/
 sempozyum_acis_konusmasi_240504.html, 25 December 2008; Chief of General Staff General Ya?ar
 Buyukanit's speech at the Military Academy, 2 October 2006, accessed at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/
 10_ARSIV/10_l_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_l_7_Konusmalar/2006/harpakademilerikonusmasi_
 02102006.html, 23 December 2008.
 60 Robert Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (New York: Routledge,
 2002), 75.
 61 Lenore Martin, "Turkey's National Security in the Middle East," Turkish Studies 1 (Spring 2000):
 83-106.
 62 Kiri?ci, "Between Europe and the Middle East.
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 of liberal democratic transformation to be welcomed in the region, Turkey's
 own performance at home would need to demonstrate that Islam, secularism,
 and liberal democracy could go together. In this sense, the AKP leadership
 appears to have believed that the continuation of the EU accession process
 and Turkey's adoption of EU foreign policy norms in the region would help
 improve Turkey's regional standing.
 Noteworthy in this regard is that unless Turkey succeeded in resolving its
 perennial Kurdish problem at home, the growing Kurdish nationalism in Iraq
 would augur badly for Turkey's territorial and societal security. The picture is
 very clear: for Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin to remain loyal to Ankara,
 and not attracted to northern Iraq, Turkey's placement in the EU accession
 process is a must. That is the most credible way to secure Ankara's power of at
 traction in the eyes of Turkey's Kurds. The continuation of the Europeanization
 process implies that resolution of the Kurdish dispute through political means is
 possible. It is within this context that several reform packages have recently been
 released that included significant changes regarding the Kurdish language and
 culture as well as political rights. The equation is straightforward: The more the
 political arena is opened for Kurdish groups to express their grievances, the less
 support the PKK receives from the public. The resolution of PKK terrorism and
 the wider Kurdish problem has now become more urgent than ever. As Osman
 Ocalan, the brother of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, bluntly put it, state
 repression was a precondition for the popular support that the PKK and its
 military uprising found among the Kurds. "We have to thank Turkey. We won
 half of the town of Cizre by our own efforts, the other half has been presented
 to us on a silver plate."63
 However, this particular outcome can also be explained by the emerging
 dynamics of the security situation in northern Iraq. In an environment in which
 the Kurds of northern Iraq have gained quasi-independence status, the out
 come of Turkey's struggle against the PKK-led ethnic separatist terrorism has
 become more vital than ever. That said, the change of course from the realist
 exclusionist to liberal integrationist approach toward the Kurds of northern Iraq
 appears to have been motivated by Ankara's concern that the Kurdish-origin
 citizens of Turkey's Kurds still feel themselves loyal to Ankara rather than being
 attracted to northern Iraq. It also appears that the war against the PKK cannot be
 won decisively without securing the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurdish groups.64
 The dynamics of the EU accession process would not suffice to understand the
 logic of such recent changes in Turkey's approach to Iraqi Kurds.
 Similarly, the possibility of Iraq's dismemberment and the emergence of
 an independent Kurdish state can only be avoided through increasing regional
 63 Hamit Bozarslan, "Human Rights and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey: 1984-1999," Human Rights
 Review 3 (October-December 2001): 45-54.
 64 Bill Park, "Iraqi Futures, Turkish Options," European Security 17 (March 2008): 85-104.
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 cooperation and forming closer relations with Iraqi Kurds in line with the EU's
 foreign policy norms. Reflecting this mentality, Turkey has lately adopted
 a liberal-integrationist approach toward the Iraqi Kurds, the prime goal of
 which is to help integrate this region into the Turkish economy by increasing
 the volume of trade and Turkish investments in the region.65 The view that
 Iraqi Kurds are Turks' relatives, rather than potential enemies, has gradually
 gained ground in Ankara. Plus, such an approach would also help improve
 Turkey's crisis-laden relations with the United States. Any military campaign
 against PKK strongholds in northern Iraq or containment of Iraqi Kurds
 through military means would have jeopardized Turkey's relations with the
 United States, particularly when the United States valued stability in northern
 Iraq and viewed the Iraqi Kurdish groups as allies.
 Realpolitik Concerns to Contain the Rising Iranian Influence in the Region
 The apparent Europeanization in Turkish foreign policy in recent years has
 also been informed by the realpolitik consideration to counterbalance the
 rising Iranian influence in the Middle East following the regime change in Iraq.
 Despite the fact that Ankara and Tehran continue to share a cooperative
 relationship based on increasing economic interactions, Ankara has equally
 grown alarmed by Tehran's increasing influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Ankara
 has two main concerns. The first pertains to the differences between the Turkish
 and Iranian models of state-religion relationship. To Ankara, strengthening
 Turkey's secular-liberal Islam is what is needed to prevent Iran's theocratic
 Islamic model from becoming dominant in the region.66 This is not only in the
 interest of Turkey but also of the larger Western international community in
 the post-September 11 era. What is critical in this regard is that for the secular
 liberal version of Islam to be perceived as more legitimate than the Iranian version
 of Islam, the former needs to produce concrete benefits for the well-being of the
 Turkish people. More importantly, it needs to be proven that Islam is not an
 obstacle to liberal democracy and free-market-oriented economic development.
 In this sense, Turkish policymakers see the continuation of the accession process
 and eventual membership in the EU as vital for the success of the Turkish model.
 A Turkey that becomes estranged from the European Union might possibly lose
 the ideological battle against Tehran.
 Second, if Iran goes nuclear and tries to export its regime to other places
 in the region, this will certainly be against Turkey's security interests. Ankara
 65 Tank Oguzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from
 the West?" Turkish Studies 9 (March 2008): 3-20, at 18.
 66 Patrick F. Gillis, "U.S. Turkish Relations: The Road to Improving a Troubled Strategic Part
 nership," USAWC Strategy Research Project Report, U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks,
 Pennsylvania (2004), accessed at http.7/www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=
 GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=AD A424313.
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 does not want to channel its limited resources into getting nuclear weapons as
 well as find itself in the midst of an armed confrontation between the West and
 Iran. The continuation of the EU accession process and Turkey's adoption of
 EU foreign policy norms in the Middle East would not only help Ankara stem
 the tide of growing Iranian influence but would also lead the Iranian regime
 not to suspect Turkey's long-term intentions in the region. If the prospects of
 Turkey's accession to the EU dwindled and Ankara pursued nationalist and
 unilateral policies in the region, Tehran would probably interpret such Turkish
 moves as threatening. On the other hand, supporting U.S.-led coercive strate
 gies toward Iran would harm Turkey's interests, for not only would Tehran
 view such a Turkey as threatening, but also Turkey's growing soft power in
 the region would be tainted.
 Conclusion
 This research has tried to demonstrate that Turkish foreign policy in recent
 years appears European. It has been argued, however, that this change has
 far more to do with realpolitik security considerations and the AKP's coming
 to power than with the dynamics of the EU accession process and Turkey's
 strong ideational commitment to EU membership. The desire to counter
 balance the United States and Iran in the post-September 11 era, to mitigate
 the negative consequences of the growing instability in the Middle East on
 security interests at home, and the AKP's efforts to help increase its domestic
 legitimacy and realize the so-called neo-Ottomanist foreign policy vision
 appear to have all brought Turkey closer to the European Union. Such a
 development has become possible despite the growing Euro-skepticism over
 the recent years. Not only the traditional security elites but also AKP circles
 have gradually adopted a critical stance on the dynamics of the EU accession
 process. The ideational commitment on the part of these circles to EU mem
 bership has radically eroded.
 Therefore, this research has argued that it would be more appropriate to
 define the recent changes in Turkey's foreign policy in EU fashion as an exam
 ple of Turkey's Europeanizing foreign policy, i.e., apparent Europeanization.
 It is certain that Turkey has come closer to the EU's foreign policy understand
 ing in terms of style, process, and outcome, yet such changes would probably
 have occurred had Turkey not been pursuing membership in the EU. Turkey
 has gradually come to view membership in the European Union as the shortest
 way to escape the danger of being drawn into the Hobbesian security environ
 ment in the Middle East. And it seems that this process will continue in the
 years to come, irrespective of the degree of Turkey's ideational commitment
 to EU membership, the degree of the EU's commitment to Turkey's accession,
 and the composition of the Turkish government.
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